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An Analysis of Pascal Lamy’s Proposal on Collective Preferences
©Steve Charnovitz*

ABSTRACT
In September 2004, then-European Commissioner for Trade Pascal Lamy released his study on the
political challenge of ‘collective preferences’ for the world trading system. Lamy defines ‘collective
preferences’ as ‘the end result of choices made by human communities that apply to the community
as a whole’. The adoption of collective preferences by governments can complicate international
trade when a good or service from an exporting country is not acceptable in an importing country.
Collective preferences cause a problem for the WTO if the resulting measure violates WTO rules and
yet the measure is too popular in the regulating country for the government to withdraw it. The
paradigmatic example is European Communities – Hormones in which the European Commission
could not comply because of contrary popular and parliamentary opinion. To address cases like that,
Lamy proposes the negotiation of a new safeguards provision in the WTO which would permit
governments to retain strongly-supported measures provided that compensation is paid. The purpose
of this article is to analyze Lamy’s paper and to contribute to the continuing international debate on
‘collective preferences’. The article concludes that while Lamy’s proposal is a worthy idea,
achieving it in the WTO is highly unlikely.
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INTRODUCTION
In his final year as European Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy initiated a study on the political
challenge of ‘collective preferences’ for the world trading system.1 The project proved controversial
and Lamy’s ideas received considerable criticism.2 When the paper was completed in September
2004, it did not emerge with the imprimatur of the Commission. Nevertheless, the ideas in Lamy’s
thoughtful paper merit more attention.
Lamy defines ‘collective preferences’ as ‘the end result of choices made by human
communities that apply to the community as a whole’.3 The community might be a nation, a
subnational unit, or an international unit. Over the centuries, he explains, socially-defined
preferences have enable human progress and serve as markers of identity. Individual choices are
synthesized through political debate via the governmental institutions inside the community.
Lamy contends that Europe has collective preferences for multilateralism, environmental
protection, food safety, cultural diversity, public provision of education and health care, precaution in
biotechnology, and welfare rights. Any such collective preference is ‘not set in stone’, Lamy
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Pascal Lamy, ‘The Emergence of Collective Preferences in International Trade: Implications for
Regulating Globalisation’, 15 September 2004, http://tradeinfo.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2004/september/tradoc_118925.pdf [hereinafter ‘Lamy Paper’] (visited 19
December 2004).
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See, e.g., Guy de Jonquieres, ‘Lamy Studies Radical Idea for Imports Veto’, Financial Times, 6
February 2004, 9; (Editorial), ‘Lamy’s Big Idea’, Financial Times, 10 February 2004, 14; ‘EU
“Collective Preferences” Concept Rings Alarm Bells in Washington’, Food Chemical News, 12 April
2004, 25; ‘UNICE Slams Lamy Over “Collective Preferences”’, European Report, 1 May 2004.
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Lamy Paper, above n 1, at 2. The tension between individual human freedom and collectivism is
not discussed in Lamy’s Paper, or in this article.
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acknowledges, but rather evolves over time.4 He also points out that collective preferences ‘are not
always rational; they are forged by political experience’ within a community.5
Outside the community, collective preferences may collide because ‘there is no legitimate
higher authority, [and] no world government, to act as referee’ and ensure that a global collective
preference emerges.6 This governance gap complicates international trade. As Lamy explains,
‘Traded goods and services are both an embodiment of and vehicle for the collective preferences of
the countries producing them; they then become an interface with the collective preferences of the
consumer country’.7 Although this phenomenon is not new, Lamy recognizes, he asserts that only
recently has this value interface become a key feature of international trade.8 Lamy points to three
factors promoting this development: (1) lower customs duties, (2) greater ‘ideological content’ of
goods and services, and (3) greater awareness of citizens and consumers.
While Lamy doubts that globalization threatens collective preferences, he points out that
incompatibility problems may arise. Lamy views the WTO disputes on hormones, shrimp-turtle, and
asbestos as disputes about collective preferences, and predicts that there will be more of such
disputes. He expresses concern that globalization and the World Trade Organization (WTO) may be
rejected by a public opinion that sees international trade and WTO rules as a threat to nationallychosen collective preferences. The ‘sudden emergence’ and ‘new difficulty’ of collective preferences
brings to light the need for governments to respond.9
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The response Lamy proposes is for the WTO to defer to national collective preferences. In
particular, he urges formal guarantees that have a legal and a ‘symbolic significance’.10 With regard
to future trade liberalization, Lamy suggests that ‘it is advisable not to push for integration in areas
rich in collective preferences’.11 With regard to future WTO rules, Lamy points to the possibility of
introducing an additional safeguard provision.
Such a safeguard would function as an ‘insurance policy’ to give a guarantee that trade
integration will not intrude on legitimate collective preferences or be a threat to social choices.12 In
order to be justified in invoking this clause, a government would have to demonstrate a coherent
underlying social demand in its country and that the measure being challenged is consistent with that
demand. The government would also have to demonstrate that the measure does not restrict trade
more than other measures capable of satisfying the social demand. Lamy’s paper implies that
collective preferences to be acknowledged cannot include protectionism. Thus, a plain tariff would
not be an eligible measure for the collective preference safeguard.
Lamy distinguishes his proposal for a new safeguard clause from the existing WTO
Agreement on Safeguards. One difference is that a government invoking the new safeguard would
have to provide immediate compensation.13 Lamy suggests that compensation could be a payment to
affected exporters in other countries, or, in the case of harm to developing countries, could be the
10

Ibid, at 8.

11

Ibid, at 9.

12

Ibid, at 10.
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Under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, a Member invoking a safeguard is required only to
‘endeavour’ to maintain a substantially equivalent level of concessions. Uruguay Round Agreement
on Safeguards, Article. 8.1. The Members concerned may agree on any adequate means of ‘trade
compensation for the adverse effects of the measure on their trade’. In the absence of suitable trade
compensation, the affected exporting Members may engage in self-help to retaliate. Ibid Article 8.2
This right to retaliate may not be exercised for the first three years of the safeguard provided that the
safeguard conforms to the Agreement and that there has been an absolute increase in imports. Ibid
Article 8.3.
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provision of trade-related technical assistance. Lamy favors the principle of compensation because a
country making social choices has a ‘responsibility to bear the external cost of those measures’.14
Another difference from the current WTO safeguard is that a country wishing to use the new escape
clause would have to conduct an internal review of the collective preference in order to find out
whether it is well-founded. This review would entail widespread consultation and further research.
If the preference is ‘unwarranted’, there should be a effort to educate people with a view to changing
their preferences.15
Lamy’s paper is rich in nuance and thus hard to capsulate. Still, this brief summary can serve
as a basis for an analysis of the ideas in Lamy’s paper.
The purpose of this article is to contribute to the international debate on ‘collective
preferences,’ and to offer some specific comments on Lamy’s paper and its proposal for a collective
preference safeguard. The article proceeds in six parts: Part I discusses the significance of the
collective preference problem and takes note of some proposals that predate Lamy’s paper. Part II
examines the many challenges in validating a collective preference. Part III considers whether
Lamy’s proposal truly would add anything new to the WTO and concludes that it would. Part IV
discusses the distinction between inwardly-directed and outwardly-directed preferences and their
different dynamics. Part V posits that whether a new safeguard is needed depends to some extent on
whether the interpretation of existing WTO provides sufficient leeway for diverse and legitimate
domestic measures. Part VI concludes.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COLLECTIVE PREFERENCE PROBLEM
The problem Lamy addresses is real. Countries will often adopt different public policies, and, as
Lamy says, trade becomes as a ‘natural point of intersection for different systems of collective
14

Above n 1, at 11.

15

Ibid.

6

preferences’.16 Clashing or distinctive collective preferences between governments have led to trade
disputes (e.g., hormones), and will assuredly do so in the future. When WTO rules inhibit domestic
autonomy, that can undermine public support for the trading system.17
As I read Lamy’s paper, he makes a distinction between the desire to insulate a domestic
market from foreign competition and the protection of particular social values. Lamy is not seeking
to provide more opportunities for mercantilism or autarky. Rather, he is implicitly distinguishing
between wealth-generation values of a society and other social values like environmental quality,
cultural diversity, or social equity. Lamy wants to preserve opportunities for values of the second
sort.
Although Lamy’s paper has been criticized for being protectionist, or unintentionally opening
the door to protectionism, such criticisms are poorly aimed. Protection does not need to insinuate its
way into the trading system. It is already legally present in the WTO rules that permit (or encourage)
tariffs, anti-dumping duties, special and differential treatment, China-specific safeguards, etc. Those
who want to oppose protectionism should focus on those pervasive practices inside the system, rather
than cavil at Lamy’s efforts to enable the WTO to better accommodate democracy. Lamy’s proposal
should be evaluated on its own terms, not dismissed simply because it may inhibit specific crossborder transactions. After all, the rationale for Lamy’s project is to maintain the political consensus
in favor of the trade-liberalizing function of the WTO.
That said, one might speculate on what a new safeguard rule would mean for global economic
efficiency. Assume that Country A has a collective preference that has been ruled a WTO violation
(e.g., a hormone ban), and the government of A decides to keep the measure anyway. Under current
16

Ibid, at 3.

17

See Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, ‘Better Rules for a New Millennium: A Warning Against
Undemocratic Developments in the WTO’, 2 JIEL 547 (1999); Bruce Stokes, ‘New Trade Barriers:
National Preferences’, National Journal, 24 April 2004, 1276. A government with a WTO-illegal
collective preference might be able to secure a waiver from the WTO Ministerial Conference.
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WTO practice, the complaining country will be authorized to impose prohibitive tariffs on A. Such a
trade cutoff lowers economic efficiency. This reduction would not happen if A compensates the
complaining country by granting it more trade access or by paying cash.
The calculation gets complicated, however, because one also has to consider the impact of the
new rule on the adoption of new collective preference measures by A. If trade sanctions against it
can now be avoided, then A may be more likely to gratify collective preferences, and that may lead to
reductions in trade and efficiency. After all, the cost of compensation will not be borne directly by
those in A who champion a preference. So the overall effect of a new safeguard on efficiency is
indeterminate in the abstract.
Although collective preferences are a challenge for the trading system, they are hardly the
new problem portrayed in Lamy’s paper. It may be true that collective preference clashes have a
greater saliency now than they did 20 or 100 years ago. Still, the challenge of social policies
embedded in traded goods is hardly new.18 It was the need to provide space for national policies that
led to the negotiations in 1927 regarding the exceptions that would be introduced into the
International Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions.19 That
Convention’s provision for policy exceptions served as the model for Article XX of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In characterizing the collective preferences debate as a
contemporary phenomenon, Lamy’s paper may give the reader the mistaken impression that GATT
and WTO law was not written to accommodate collective preferences. This neglect of history leads
to a distortion in Lamy’s analysis because he does not consider the extent to which a more flexible

18

See Josef Grunzel, Economic Protectionism (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1916) 192–99 (discussing
‘Protection by Concerted Popular Action’).
19

International Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions, done
at Geneva, 8 November 1927, 46 U.S. Statutes at Large 2461, arts. 4, 5 (not in force).
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interpretation of the trade law general exceptions20 could produce a solution to the WTO legitimacy
problems he is addressing. Indeed, in two of the examples that he points to (shrimp-turtle and
asbestos), the GATT exceptions did provide space for the national preference being challenged.
That Lamy has overlooked some of the important literature is also noticeable in his discussion
of the ‘interface’ function. John H. Jackson presented the interface concept in his 1989 book The
World Trading System.21 Alongside an exposition of the basics of the traditional GATT safeguard,
Jackson noted that ‘In a world of increasing economic interdependence, there may be additional
arguments which support safeguard programs’.22 The situation Jackson was addressing at the time
was the need to allow ‘independent choice of economic systems for societies’ and to ‘prevent too
much pressure for change of the domestic economic structure resulting from increased international
trade originating in economies which are structured differently’.23 The collective preferences
considered by Jackson in 1989 are perhaps more structural than the ones being considered by Lamy
today. Yet both boil down to the clash of national values and ideologies played out in the trading
arena.

20

See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT), Articles XX, XXI; General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS), arts. XIV, XIV bis, Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), Articles 13, 17, 30, 73. All of these
exceptions in my view concern collective preferences. Several major World Trade Organization
(WTO) agreements overseeing domestic policy do not contain general exceptions—namely, the
Uruguay Round Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement), the Uruguay Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, and the Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).
21

John H. Jackson, The World Trading System (Cambridge: MIT Press 1992). Jackson’s attention to
the ‘interface’ problem goes back at least as early as 1978. Ibid, at 378.
22

Ibid, 218, 305.

23

Ibid, at 152–53.
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Other analysts have also suggested the need to expand the availability of a safeguard for
national policies. In 1996, Dani Rodrik proposed a ‘social-safeguards’ clause for labor standards.24
According to Rodrik, it is ‘axiomatic that no nation has to maintain free trade with a country or in a
specific product if doing so would require violating a widely held ethical standard or social
preference at home’.25 In 2001, the team of Nicholas Perdikis, William A. Kerr, and Jill E. Hobbs
suggested the negotiation of a WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Consumer Concerns
that would separate producer-based trade restrictions from consumer-based trade restrictions.26 The
Agreement could permit governments to impose trade barriers based on consumer concerns, subject
to paying compensation set through compulsory arbitration. To assist governments in evaluating the
existence and intensity of consumer concerns, the authors called for an international Commission on
Consumer Issues and Trade. In 2004, Jagdish Bhagwati suggested that the WTO could show more
flexibility when the Appellate Body ‘finds against legislative or executive actions that are virtually
dictated by public opinion’.27 In Bhagwati’s proposal, the government implicated would ‘make a tort
payment to the injured industry’ based on the profits lost by the exporters.28 Lamy’s paper fails to
mention any of these earlier proposals.

24

Dani Rodrik, ‘Labor Standards in International Trade: Do They Matter and What Do We Do About
Them?’, in Robert Z. Lawrence, Dani Rodrik and John Whalley, Emerging Agenda for Global Trade:
High Stakes for Developing Countries (Washington: Overseas Development Council 1996) 35, 62.
Rodrik introduced the idea in 1995.
25

Rodrik, above n 24, at 63 (emphasis deleted).

26

Nicholas Perdikis, William A. Kerr and Jill E. Hobbs, ‘Reforming the WTO to Defuse Potential
Trade Conflicts in Genetically Modified Goods’, 24 The World Economy 379 (2001), at 394–97.
27

Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press 2004) 152.

28

Ibid.
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II. VALIDATING COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES
One of the most interesting parts of Lamy’s paper is his discussion of the identification and validation
of collective preferences. Two dialogic processes are noted. First, a government wishing to use the
new WTO safeguard would have to conduct an internal review of the collective preference. Although
Lamy’s paper is sketchy, he seems to be saying that the government would instigate a reassessment
of the collective preference to see whether it is a ‘genuine’ social expression and to see whether it is
warranted.29 If found to be ‘unwarranted’, then there would be an effort to educate people with a
view to changing their preferences.30 The second process is that a government would have to
demonstrate to the WTO the genuineness of its collective preference by showing a coherent
underlying social demand. Lamy does not elaborate the details of either process.
The implicit but unexamined assumption in Lamy’s paper is that a popularly-supported policy
has more international valence than a policy dictated by fiat. In other words, Lamy seems to be
saying that the WTO should show greater respect for broad and intense public opinion than for
policies chosen through bureaucratic expertise, judicial authority, or political representation.
As applied to the WTO, this is a revolutionary concept. The self-perception of the WTO is an
organization comprised of impermeable ‘Members’. At home, the members might be democratic
states (like France), non-democratic state (like Cuba), or non-state customs territories (like Taiwan).
Yet inside the WTO, membership is homologous and those three categories have no relevance. As a
consequence, no WTO rule or status is linked to the support of public opinion within a country.31
29

Above n 1, at 8.

30

Ibid, at 11.

31

The closest one gets is Article 3.1 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards, which calls for
a ‘public hearing’ in which interested parties can present their views on whether a safeguard would
be in the public interest. See also Uruguay Round Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement and Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), Articles 5.1, 5.4
(requiring the initiation of antidumping investigation when proposed on behalf of the domestic
industry, with no status provided for contrary public opinion).
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Lamy does not explain why this member-centrism should be uprooted. The paradigm of
WTO decisionmaking is that governments speak for their citizens and that the WTO does not look
inside the veil of the individual Member.32 For example, the WTO does not require Members to
demonstrate parliamentary approval for joining the WTO or amending its agreements.33
Consequently, Lamy is making a revolutionary suggestion in saying that whether a collective
preference should qualify for a safeguard depends on the objective existence of an underlying social
demand. Under existing practice across all WTO agreements, a government’s mere assertion of a
position would be sufficient at the WTO even if the position completely fails to reflect popular will
within that country.34
Lamy’s paper elides this normative issue as well as the practical problems the WTO faces in
validating a collective preference. Such validation will be difficult enough for the European Union or
the United States, but how is it to be done for China or Cuba? Moreover, if citizen support is to be a
precondition for a collective preference safeguard, then perhaps it should also be a precondition for a

32

A few marginal exceptions exist: One area where the veil has been pierced are the arbitral awards
under Article 21.3 of the Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU). That provision provides for setting the ‘reasonable period of time’ for
implementation. A norm that has developed is that implementation requiring a legislative change is
likely to get more time than implementation needing only an administrative change. See Pierre
Monnier, ‘The Time to Comply with an Adverse WTO Ruling’, 35(5) Journal of World Trade 825
(2001). Some veil piercing can also be seen in GATT Article XXVIII bis 3(a) (individual industries).
33

See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article X:1 (expressing no
requirement for parliamentary approval of a Member’s acceptance of WTO amendment). But see
WTO Secretariat, ‘The WTO . . . In Brief’,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm (visited 19 December 2004)
(‘Virtually all decisions in the WTO are taken by consensus among all member countries and they are
ratified by members' parliaments’.).
34

See WTO Secretariat, ‘WTO Policy Issues for Parliamentarians’, at 13,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (visited 19 December 2004) (‘If the
claim that ‘governments do not represent the interests of citizens’ were true, then it is something that
citizens need to correct at home. It is not something that an inter-governmental body like WTO can
deal with’.).
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regular safeguard in the WTO.35 On what basis should the WTO inquire about citizen preferences on
some issues if not on all issues? Another practical problem in discovering public preferences is what
to do about untoward government influence in shaping those preferences. This concern was
identified by the European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines panel in its comment on
‘self-justifying’ regulatory trade barriers.36 If government action has helped to create irrational yet
strongly-held consumer preferences, should such preferences qualify for the new safeguard? Lamy
does not address these difficult questions.
Lamy does not present details on how a WTO Member would show that a contested
preference is based on an underlying social demand rather than on special-interest politics. Polling is
one possibility; holding a referendum is another. If polling is used, it will be important to formulate
the question carefully. Consider two possible policy questions on hormones: Question #1 is: ‘Do
you want to keep the ban on hormones in imported meat even though the WTO has ruled that it
violates trade rules?’. Question #2 is: ‘Do you want to keep the ban on hormones in imported meat
recognizing that under WTO rules, the United States gets to exact $117 million of benefits from
Europe each year?’. The second question is better because it attaches a cost to the preference.
Lamy’s suggestions for in-country validation are less problematic. He maintains that a
collective preference safeguard would lead to better dialogue within a polity as the government
35

The Agreement on Safeguards, Article 3.1, requires governments to entertain comments from
interested parties regarding whether the safeguard would be ‘in the public interest’. No WTO
caselaw has suggested that a panel can second-guess whether a government properly decided whether
a safeguard was in the public interest. In general, WTO rules do not require a government to take
into account the costs of its own trade measure to its own economy. In United States – Gasoline, the
Appellate Body held that the U.S. regulation violated the WTO because, inter alia, the U.S.
government had not taken into account the cost of its regulation on foreign producers. WTO
Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, at 28. No parallel jurisprudence requires governments to take
into account homeland costs.
36

See WTO Panel Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/R,
adopted as modified by the Appellate Body 23 October 2002, para. 7.127 (discussing the danger that
WTO Members could shape consumer expectations through regulatory intervention).
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engages in deliberation with the public about a particular collective preference.37 Lamy does not give
an example. In my view, European Communities – EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones)38 is an instance where a discursive process for clarifying social choice could
have been useful in encouraging the public to reconsider the scientific evidence, or lack therefore,
underlying the hormone ban. My impression is that the WTO’s rejection of the Commission’s
defense did not trigger any dialectic reconsideration within Europe as to the wisdom of the hormones
ban. If Lamy’s new safeguard would promote a robust national dialogue, that could be a constructive
contribution.
Rodrik’s 1996 proposal is more detailed regarding validation at the national level. Rodrik
suggests that individuals seeking a social safeguard would petition their government and then the
government would hold a public hearing where all sides would express their views.39 Following the
hearing, the administrative agency would decide whether the claim for the safeguard has broad-based
public support. Rodrik would require testimony from groups whose material interests would be
adversely affected by the requested trade restriction. Unless such groups support the safeguard, it
would not be imposed.
Although Lamy’s paper focuses on internal policy review within the country seeking to
exercise a defensive safeguard, one can also imagine the value of public discussion in the country
lodging a WTO complaint. For example, one wonders if Canada’s loss in European Communities –
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products led to any social dialogue within

37

The importance of promoting deliberation was noted by Jan Tumlir in his Wincott Memorial
Lecture in 1984. Jan Tumlir, Economic Policy as a Constitutional Problem (London: Institute of
Economic Affairs 1984) 12–13.
38

WT/DS26,48, adopted 13 February 1998. The case is discussed in Reinhard Quick and Andreas
Blüthner, ‘Has the Appellate Body Erred? An Appraisal and Criticism of the Ruling in the WTO
Hormones Case’, 2 JIEL 603 (1999).
39

Rodrik, above n 24, at 63–65.

14

Canada about the practice of using or exporting asbestos. My impression is that it did not. There
could also be benefit in stimulating a public discussion before a government commences litigation in
the WTO. In the hormones dispute, I do not know if U.S. public opinion would have supported
lodging the case.
Social dialogue may also be of value in a defendant country losing a WTO case. This could
occur if a special interest provision is found to be WTO-illegal and public opinion get aroused in
favor of repeal. At present, there is no connection between the surveillance carried out by the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)40 and the domestic process for coming into compliance. By
improving the transparency of the DSB, the WTO could tap into the power of public opinion. The
greater ensuing public awareness might promote compliance.
III. THE VALUE-ADDED OF A NEW SAFEGUARD
Lamy presents his proposal as a new initiative for the WTO, and yet it is worth asking what is new.
The European Communities – Hormones case shows that a WTO Member enjoying a collective
preference can keep it, notwithstanding the WTO ruling against it. Furthermore, if the Community
chose to compensate the countries affected by its hormone ban, it could settle the complaints against
it in full conformity to the rules of the WTO.41 So what exactly does the Lamy plan add? Answering
this question requires a discussion of the WTO rules on compensation and compliance.
A.

Compensation

Although compensation can occur now, it often does not because trade compensation has to be
performed on a most-favoured-nation (MFN) basis.42 In other words, any trade concession granted to
a complaining party would also have to be granted to all other WTO Members. This MFN rule
40

DSU Article 21.6.

41

See DSU Articles 3.3, 3.6, 3.7, 22.8 (settlement), 3.7, 22.1 (compensation).

42

See DSU Article 22.1, GATT Article I.
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makes the direct cost of compensation high. Furthermore, the cost of compensation snowballs when
one considers the need to tailor it to every affected country and the buildup of transaction costs in
negotiating such compensation. Take hormones as an example. Perhaps Europe could have
negotiated trade concessions for the two complaining countries, the United States and Canada. But
once compensation is promised, other countries can threaten to bring the same WTO case and would
have to be compensated with trade concessions that would be different from the ones particularized
for the United States and Canada. Each compensation package would then have to be granted
unconditionally to other WTO Members. This gets expensive on a mercantilist metric, and explains
why negotiated compensation will often fail. Instead the default—’suspension of concessions or
other obligations’43 by the complaining countries—will tend to be used because the defendant country
can avoid liberalizing on an MFN basis and accruing the transactions costs for negotiating that
liberalization.
Whether Lamy’s plan cuts this Gordian knot is unclear. To the extent that Lamy relies on
traditional trade compensation, the same practical difficulties arise. But Lamy has a different plan.
He suggests that the compensation go directly to ‘affected exporters’ and ‘take the form of payment
of a pre-set amount’.44 Compensation of this sort seems not to have been contemplated by the
drafters of the Uruguay Round agreements. Financial compensation to private economic actors is an
innovative approach that may avoid the way in which MFN leads to overcompensation.45 All victim
countries would still have to be paid off, but only once. Yet while the direct cost of compensation

43

DSU Article 22.7.

44

Above n 1, at 11.

45

MFN leads to overcompensation because the compensation tailored for Country A is enjoyed by B,
C, etc. and the compensation tailored for B is enjoyed by A, C, etc. Thus, B and C get
overcompensated.
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might be less expensive46 under Lamy’s plan (as compared to the DSU), Lamy may not have a
solution to the problem of transaction costs.47 Lamy’s paper does not discuss how the amount of
compensation is to be determined.48 As the Perdikis, Kerr, and Hobbs study notes, international
arbitration could be used. Taking hormones as an example, one could imagine an arbitrator
determining how much the affected U.S. meat exporters should be recompensed by the European
Commission. Granting compensation directly to victims is better than passing it down through a
government.49 The proposition that WTO Members are ready to endorse state responsibility to
individuals is dubious however.50
Lamy is not ready to go all the way for developing countries. Even though affected exporters
in developed countries are to receive payments, exporters in developing countries apparently are not.
For developing countries, Lamy prescribes ‘complementary policies’ such as trade-related technical

46

The ‘budget cost’ of Lamy’s plan would be more expensive.

47

Lamy says that compensation is to be ‘pre-set’. Above n 1, at 11. I cannot imagine a workable
formula.
48

Lamy suggests that exporters are only to be ‘partially’ compensated, but does not explain why
compensation should be less than 100 cents on the Euro. Ibid.
49

See ‘Bhopal: The World’s Worst Industrial Disaster; Victims Still Wait for Compensation’, The
Record (Kitchener-Waterloo), 3 December 2004, A1 (discussing the slow distribution of funds from
Union Carbide settlement with Indian government in 1989).
50

The closest the WTO has gotten is United States – Copyright Act, where the DSU Article 25
arbitrator estimated the amount of royalties that were not being paid to European right holders
because of the U.S. measure. Award of the Arbitrators, United States – Section 110(5) of the US
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assistance or capacity building.51 Lamy does not explain why developed country exporters are to be
given more favorable treatment than developing country exporters.
Perhaps the reason is a presumption by Lamy that the injured exporters in the developed
countries are not doing anything wrong while the exporters in developing countries probably are and
so it would be unjust to compensate them directly. To take an example, the exporters in Myanmar
using forced labor do not deserve compensation, while the exporters in the United States using
hormones do because hormone use is not known to be unsafe. Whether or not this example52 is
convincing to the reader, it may demonstrate that the conditions justifying compensation are not
found only in developed countries.
In Rodrik’s social safeguard proposal, compensation would be required for democratic
countries but not authoritarian ones.53 The logic is that when Country A enforces its collective
preference against Country B, if B is democratic, then the conditions in B reflect the persisting
collective preferences of B’s electorate. So A should acknowledge the conflict in preferences by
compensating B. Rodrik has offered a normatively appealing bright-line rule, but its workability
depends on being able to determine which countries are democratic.
The puzzle of who should get compensated is accompanied by the puzzle of why
compensation should occur. Notions of ‘international fairness and responsibility’ justify
compensation, according to Lamy’s paper. He explains that ‘our trading partners pay a heavy price
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Above n 1, at 11.
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Bhagwati offers the example of compensating producers of factory-farmed chickens. He says that
‘the payment is likely to be regarded as paying sinners for not practicing vices!’. Bhagwati, above
note 27, at 152.
53

Above n 24, at 66–67.
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for some of our domestic choices’.54 This gives the countries pursuing a collective preference the
‘responsibility to bear the external cost of those measures’.55
This argument seems to imply that the rationale for the compensation is the transborder
financial harm rather than the WTO-illegality of the collective preference. That would be a farreaching justification for compensation because it would also apply to commercial policies such as
tariffs and quotas. If the European Community has a low import quota for meat, it is exacting a
‘heavy price’ on foreign producers just as much as when the Community has a ban on hormones.
Lamy presumably is not suggesting that governments using tariffs or employing trade remedies have
a responsibility to compensate the frustrated foreign exporters. Nor is he suggesting that measures
ostensibly taken for national security (and thus exempt from many WTO rules) should trigger
compensation. So his argument for compensation, even though clothed as a justice claim, would
seem to hark back to the nature and exceptionality of the safeguard and its presumptive inconsistency
with current WTO rules.
In my view, compensation can serve two objectives. First, Country A compensates Country B
because A’s treatment of B violates WTO rules. Second, the compensation by A signals to Countries
B, C, D, etc. that A is not acting in a self-interested way. In other words, A’s act to compensate
shows the world that its safeguard is for altruistic reasons not commercial ones.
Another issue that Lamy does not discuss is the difficulty that lower-income countries would
face in providing financial compensation. If Countries A and B both inhibit the same dollar value of
trade with Country C, then both countries would owe C’s exporters a commensurate amount of
compensation. But if A is a high-income country and B is a low-income country, then B may be less
able to pay the compensation, and thus less able to keep the collective preference.
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B.

Legitimizing Preferences

Lamy contends that his proposed safeguard clause is the ‘ultimate guarantee that trade integration
will not pose a threat to legitimate collective preferences’.56 Furthermore, he states that ‘The
outcome of conflicts involving collective preferences would be much the same as today but the
existence of a safety net like a safeguard clause would enable the parties concerned to achieve that
outcome without generating so much tension and friction’.57 The avoidance of the tension and
friction would come, presumably, because the safeguard would legitimize the continuation of the
contested trade measure notwithstanding WTO rules. In other words, WTO members could keep
their community preferences so long as they were willing to pay for them through compensation.
Given that description of Lamy’s plan, the question arises whether it amounts to any real
difference from current WTO law. After all, the WTO does not really ‘strike down’ national laws,
even though commentators sometimes say that.58 A WTO Member can refuse to lift a trade barrier
ruled to be a WTO violation as Europe did in the hormones dispute and the United States did in the
Byrd Amendment dispute. Everyone would agree that ultimately, achieving compliance is up to the
government found to be in violation.
Where there is a disagreement is whether WTO rules give the defending government a formal
obligation to comply or merely an obligation to accept retaliation should it not comply. John H.
Jackson has championed the notion that governments do have an obligation to comply.59 Warren F.
56

Ibid, at 10.

57

Ibid.

58
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Appellate Body ‘strike down’ national regulations).
59
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of Legal Obligation’ 90 AJIL 60 (1997); Jackson, ‘International Law Status of WTO Dispute
Settlement Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?’, 98 AJIL 109 (2004).
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Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes have ably argued that non-compliance may be an acceptable outcome.60
I have sided with Jackson in this debate.61
If one accepts that governments have an obligation to comply with WTO panel rulings against
them, then Lamy’s proposal does add something of value. The new safeguard would re-legitimize an
otherwise WTO-illegal act based on a genuine collective preference. Right now, the European Union
is a scofflaw in the WTO because it has not complied with the European Communities – Hormones
ruling.62 This disconnect between the Community’s legal responsibility and its internal political
capacity to make the required change has proved embarrassing. The new safeguard would provide an
escape clause for governments in such circumstances.
The other major innovation is to enable the government with the WTO-illegal collective
preference to buy its way out rather than to suffer a ‘suspension of concessions or other obligations’
(‘SCOO’) selected by the complaining party. Agreed trade compensation will continue to be possible
under Lamy’s proposal as it is now. But Lamy’s plan adds an additional option not plainly available
now of paying non-trade compensation.
IV. WHAT TO DO ABOUT OUTWARDLY-DIRECTED PREFERENCES
Lamy’s paper does not discuss whether there are to be limits to the range of permissible preferences.
Two types of preferences are at stake—(1) inwardly-directed preferences, for example, regarding
60

Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes, ‘The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute
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Julio Lacarte and Jaime Granados (eds), Inter-Governmental Trade Dispute Settlement: Multilateral
and Regional Approaches (London: Cameron May 2004) 151, 161.
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In late 2004, the European Commission announced that Europe was now in compliance with the
European Communities – Hormones decision. Chris Clayton, ‘EU Assails Continuing Sanctions’,
Omaha World-Herald, 9 November 2004, 3D. Rather than seek a compliance ruling under DSU
Article 21.5, however, the Commission is requesting an original panel to consider the lawfulness of
continued U.S. retaliation. The non-use of Article 21.5 would seem to be a tactic to secure a new
panel in order to avoid being judged by members of the original panel.
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food wholesomeness, and (2) outwardly-directed preferences, for example, to preserve tropical
forests in other countries.63 The paper discusses both types, so presumably Lamy is not making a
distinction between them. Among the outwardly-directed preferences he discusses are turtle
protection, death penalty, forced labor, and child labor. He also states that ‘Most of the difficulties
with collective preferences arise when countries think that their choices should apply to everyone, not
just to them’.64
In my view, the dichotomy between inwardly and outwardly-directed preferences is
important. This distinction is not an question of ‘processes and production methods’65 because PPMs
are used for both inward and outward preferences.66 Rather, the dichotomy hinges on the purpose of
the contested governmental measure. Food safety measures like Europe’s hormone ban may set
standards for practices in the United States, but the ostensible purpose of the measure is to protect the
health of European consumers. The distinction gets murky, however, because any outwardly-directed
measure will have been stimulated by the volitions of individuals inside the regulating country. For
example, the United States law banning imports of dog and cat fur products67 is outwardly-directed,
but the law also satisfies a demand inside the United States for taking this action. Nevertheless, there
is a difference between the two types of preferences, particularly in their interface dynamics.
The outwardly-directed measure is more problematic because of the potential clash in the
collective preferences chosen by importing and exporting countries. The people of the United States
63

See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, ‘Trade Sanctions and Human Rights – Past, Present, and Future’, 6
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may have a collective preference for preventing the slaughter of dogs and cats for fur, but the people
of China (for example) may have a preference for engaging in such slaughter. This is not a conflict
of law because the United States is not trying to make pet slaughter unlawful in China. Rather, it is a
clash of collective preferences. Trade in dog and cat fur is being stymied by the collective
preferences in the United States failing to match the collective preferences in China.68 If the U.S. ban
is ever ruled WTO-illegal, Lamy’s safeguard would allow the United States to keep the ban so long
as it compensates the producers in China. (One wonders though whether U.S. public opinion would
tolerate using U.S. taxes to pay off Chinese animal skinners any more than U.S. public opinion would
tolerate repealing the law.)
The dog fur example shows the complexity of the interface possibilities. For an inwardlydirected preference like meat produced without injected hormones, the clash between preferences is
limited because European consumers can enjoy non-hormone meat and the U.S. consumers can enjoy
the hormone meat. The trade dispute can be worked if U.S. producers ship non-hormone meat to
Europe or if Europe compensates the United States.69 For an outwardly-directed preference like a ban
on fur trade, there is a greater clash in preferences because if the U.S. ban does not prevent the animal
slaughter, then the United States cannot achieve that objective in China. The only benefit from the
U.S. ban would be to prevent U.S. moral complicity. For other outwardly-directed preferences, the
interface will be much harder because it will not be possible for both sides to continue to enjoy their
preferences. These are the challenges where international collective action is needed. Take climate
change, for example, where Europe has a greater collective preference for taking action than does the
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United States. If Europe were to impose an emissions tax on U.S. imports, and it does not induce
U.S. cooperation, then the tax will not accomplish anything for Europe toward satisfying its
preferences of preventing climate change. Unlike the dog fur ban, where Lamy’s safeguard would
allow the United States to continue excluding the fur, for climate change, the safeguard would not
offer any benefit to Europe if it has to compensate U.S. exporters for the emissions tax. The same
obstacle exists for other issues where collective preferences need to be translated into international
collective action, for example, fishery conservation or the prevention of nuclear proliferation. This
category of issues is characterized by substantial transborder physical externalities and is sometimes
referred to as ‘global public goods’. The usefulness of the collective preference safeguard for global
public goods seems doubtful.
Would the collective preference safeguard be more justifiable for inwardly-directed than
outwardly-directed measures? Arguably so, yet one also has to consider an issue not addressed much
in Lamy’s paper—that is, whether WTO rules leave enough discretion for domestic measures. Lamy
seems to think that the rules do. He states that the WTO Appellate Body ‘has been a faithful
guardian of “collective preferences” under the WTO system’.70 This view is echoed by the WTO
Secretariat which asserts on the WTO website that ‘Compliance with WTO Agreements does not in
any way reduce the right of a government to make laws for its own territories’.71 In my view, such
assurances may not be justified. As WTO disciplines get interpreted more stringently, the need for a
collective preference safeguard would increase. Part V looks at this issue.
V. SUPERVISION OF DOMESTIC POLICY BY WTO RULES
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WTO Secretariat, ‘WTO Policy Issues for Parliamentarians’, 2001, at 11,
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WTO rules govern not only trade measures but also many domestic measures that may have
implications for trade. The supervision of domestic policy is the most controversial feature of WTO
law. Table 1 below shows many of the ways in which WTO rules can potentially prevent nonprotectionist domestic measures designed to achieve collective preferences. The intent in Table 1 is
to consider only inwardly-directed preferences. In a few instances, footnotes are added where the
entry may be obscure.
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Table 1. Supervision of Collective Preferences By WTO Agreements

Collective Preference

Key Governing WTO Provisions

Grants to Domestic Producers

Agreement on Agriculture, SCM Agreement72,
Anti-Dumping Agreement73

Taxes on Domestic Persons and Products

SCM Agreement

Taxes on Foreign Persons and Imports

GATT, GATS

Regulations on Imported Products/Services

GATT, GATS, SPS Agreement, TBT Agreement

Regulation of Criminal Activity

Antidumping Agreement74, GATS, TRIPS
Agreement

Informational/Labeling Requirements

TBT Agreement

Stewardship of Global Commons75

GATT, GATS, TBT Agreement, TRIPS
Agreement

Delineation of Ownership

TRIPS Agreement

Whether these rules actually do infringe on legitimate domestic measures will depend on how
they are adjudicated by WTO panels and the Appellate Body. Without suggesting here that any of
this jurisprudence was wrongly decided, let me briefly note several WTO decisions that have
implications for the fulfillment of domestic autonomy. In United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916,
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Unfortunately, WTO Members allowed this provision to expire in 2000.
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Stewardship of the global commons is not solely externally-directed because every nation shares in
the commons.
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a longtime U.S. antitrust law was found to violate the Anti-Dumping Agreement.76 In United States –
Continued Dumping and Offset Subsidy Act of 2000 (known as the Byrd Amendment case), a cash
payment to injured producers was found to violate the GATT and the Antidumping and SCM
Agreements.77 In Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, a sanitary control restricting
ocean-caught Pacific salmon was found to violate the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).78 The specific violation was that the government’s chosen level of
protection against pathogenic salmon risks was inconsistent with its chosen protection against risks
from comparable products (namely herring, cod, haddock, eel, finfish, and other Canadian salmon)
and the distinctions being made by Australia were arbitrary or unjustifiable and were perceived by the
panel to result in a ‘disguised restriction on international trade’.79 In European Communities –
Sardines, a European food labeling regulation was found to violate the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) because the regulation was not based on a relevant international standard.80
The Communities lost the case notwithstanding its argument that the international standard was an
ineffective or inappropriate means for fulfilling the European regulatory objective.81
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adopted 26 September 2000. For critical commentary, see Mitsui Matsushita and Douglas E.
Rosenthal, ‘Was the WTO Mistaken in Ruling on Antidumping Act of 1916?’, BNA International
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The trumping of domestic social objectives by WTO rules can also be seen in the decisions on
public policy exceptions where these provisions have been interpreted stringently. One biting aspect
of this jurisprudence is the use of a ‘weighing and balancing’ analysis in which three factors—(1) the
contribution of the disputed measure to the country employing it, (2) the ‘importance’ of the
‘common interests or values’ protected by the measure, and (3) the impact of the measure on trade—
are weighed against each other.82 The weighing occurs in the context of determining whether the
importing country’s measure is ‘necessary’. In European Communities – Conditions for the Granting
of Tariff Preferences, the ‘weighing and balancing’ technique was extended to determine whether the
purported health measure was cognizable as a health measure under GATT Article XX(b).83 The
panel weighed the health benefits of the measure to Europe against what the panel perceived as the
‘damage of the measure to the multilateral negotiating framework’, and then decided that this alleged
damage was enough for it to refuse to accept the narcotics control effort as a health measure.84 In my
view, when the availability of the GATT’s public policy exceptions hinges on the commercial impact
of the measure on other countries, the WTO dispute system will be engaging in inter-country
comparisons of utility. Such judgments will be hard to make in a principled and predictable fashion.
For example, the Appellate Body has not yet explained how it measures the ‘importance’ of a
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national ‘value’.85 In European Communities – Tariff Preferences, the panel did not explain how one
determines when national actions damage the multilateral trading system.
In the first ‘General Exceptions’ case adjudicated under the GATS, the panel held that for a
measure to be ‘necessary’ under the moral exception in GATS Article XIV(a), the United States was
required to negotiate with Antigua to see if a way could be found to avoid the harm associated with
the internet gambling services that Antigua’s private sector was offering to U.S. residents.86 The fact
that the United States had not entered into negotiations was a key reason why it lost the case at the
panel level. The panel went so far as to say that U.S. negotiation with Antigua was required even if
the United States considered the gambling ban ‘indispensable’.87 Note that the panel did not suggest
that seeking to negotiate was a principle of international law that serves a backdrop to the GATS.88
Instead, the panel discovered the requirement to negotiate by employing the Appellate Body’s
‘weighing and balancing’ test.89 As has often happened in GATT/WTO jurisprudence of public
policy exceptions, panels seem eager to add substantive and procedural hurdles not present in the
treaty text.

85

Korea – Beef, above n 82, para. 164. For example, does a Lamy-style collective preference have
greater importance than a regulation drawn up by bureaucrats?
86

WTO Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and
Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, circulated 10 November 2004, paras. 6.529–6.533. In reaching this
conclusion, the panel found relevant a similar holding given in the panel decision in the first tunadolphin case. Ibid para. 6.526 and n. 980 (recalling the Appellate Body’s dictum that panels might
find unadopted GATT panel reports to offer useful guidance). In my view, any time a WTO panel
follows the reasoning of the unadopted 1991 and 1994 tuna-dolphin reports, the results will prove as
mischievous for the WTO as they did for the GATT.
87

United States – Gambling, above n 86, para. 6.534 (suggesting that for a state’s trade measure to be
‘necessary’ under GATT Article XX, the state should first pursue other appropriate measures such as
diplomatic overtures or foreign assistance).
88

Cleveland, above n 82, at 166.

89

United States – Gambling, above n 86, para. 6.477.

29

In taking note of this jurisprudence, I do not mean to suggest that no national collective
preference is safe at the WTO. My point only is that the evolution of the jurisprudence on public
policy exceptions should be a central factor in considering whether a new safeguard is needed. In
contending that WTO dispute system ‘has been a faithful guardian’ of collective preferences, Lamy’s
paper skips over important legal and factual questions. In my view, such a safeguard will become
more urgent if trends continue in the WTO to denigrate the exceptions. Let me reiterate that my
analysis focuses on inwardly-directed preferences. The WTO jurisprudence on outwardly-directed
preferences is another matter.
Perhaps Lamy’s view on guardianship is colored by a misunderstanding. For example, he
sees the Appellate Body decision in United States – Shrimp as ‘departing’ from a ‘strict jurisdictional
reading’ of GATT Article XX(g), and his paper seems to favor that broader geographic scope.90 In
fact, however, the Appellate Body did not make that departure.91
V. CONCLUSION
In an interconnected world, value-free trade is a fiction. Individuals, groups, and governments are
sure to have preferences about international commerce that will complicate voluntary transactions
between buyer and seller. Recognizing this difficulty, Lamy wants the WTO to experiment with a
new safeguard for collective preferences that violate WTO rules. Lamy is trying to safeguard
democratic choices at the national level from being overridden in the WTO. Equally important, he is
trying to safeguard the WTO from a free market zeal that could undermine public support for the
trading system. Lamy’s purpose is apposite in my view.
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Nevertheless, I doubt the political practicality of adding a new safeguard to the WTO. The
problem is that many governments would oppose the idea and demand a high front-end payment for
accepting it even though each recourse to the safeguard entails a compensatory payment Thus, I
predict a continuation of the status quo in which powerful governments retain WTO-illegal collective
preferences and suffer any ensuing SCOO.
Lamy’s attention to the process of domestic validation has independent merit. Governments
exposed to pressures for unwise collective preferences can do a better job engaging in deliberation
and promoting public education. Expecting politicians to exhibit that kind of leadership may be
utopian.

